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A Family Tradition: Giving Meaning to Family Unity and
Decreasing Illegal Immigration Through Anthropology
MICAH BENNETT*
INTRODUCTION: IVÁN’S FAMILY, AN ALLEGORY
Iván, a migrant from Rancho San Marcos, San Luis Potosí, Mexico, who now
legally resides in the United States, attempted to reunite his family in the United
States through legal channels after some time of being separated from them by the
U.S.-Mexico border.1 In so doing, Iván succeeded in bringing his wife and four of
his five children, then ages seventeen, sixteen, thirteen, and three, to the United
States.2 His fifth child—an unmarried twenty-one-year-old daughter—however, did
not qualify for a visa under U.S. immigration law.3 Consequently, while the
remainder of the family left Mexico and reunited in the United States, Iván’s fifth
child (“Bella”) remained behind in Mexico with her grandmother, an event that
caused considerable stress for the family.4 Despite the hardship, because of the
narrow construction of “family” in U.S. immigration law—a construct that deviates
considerably from how a Mexican national would understand it5—Iván’s family
was forced to live with this arrangement if its members wished to comply with U.S.
law.6
Iván’s story, commonly replicated in transnational households,7 exemplifies the
unduly narrow definition of family in U.S. immigration law. As numerous scholars

* I would like to thank all who offered invaluable advice during the drafting and
editing of this Note, especially Dr. Patricia Minter, Dr. Roger Levesque, and Professor Aviva
Orenstein. Moreover, I would like to thank the entire editorial staff at the Indiana Law
Journal for helping to prepare this Note for publication.
1. DEBORAH A. BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS: GENDER, FAMILY, AND ILLEGALITY
AMONG TRANSNATIONAL MEXICANS 17, 61 (2012) [hereinafter BOEHM, INTIMATE
MIGRATIONS]. In another work, Boehm again offers Iván’s story but refers to him, instead,
by the pseudonym “Ernesto.” Deborah A. Boehm, “For My Children:” Constructing Family
and Navigating the State in the U.S.-Mexico Transnation, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 777, 794
(2008) [hereinafter Boehm, For My Children]. Boehm does not, in either work, tell whether
Iván is a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident. This, however, allows for manipulation
of the allegory to better demonstrate certain aspects of immigration law that this Note
analyzes. See infra text accompanying notes 104–32.
2. Boehm, For My Children, supra note 1, at 794.
3. Id.; BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 61; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1) (2012) (defining “child” as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of
age”).
4. BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 35, 61.
5. Id.
6. See 9 U.S. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN, NO. 60,
at 2 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013], available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/visabulletin_september2013.pdf (explaining the
current wait times for approval of visa applications by preference category); see also infra
notes 110–112 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Rhacel Salazar Parreñas & Cerissa Salazar Parreñas, Workers Without
Families: The Unintended Consequences, 10 ASIAN L.J. 143, 143–44 (2003). The article tells
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have ably argued, the law is both static and outdated.8 Its devotion to the ideal of
the traditional nuclear conception of the household, where a family consists of “two
married, opposite-sex parents and their children,”9 makes American immigration
law’s notion of family far too restrictive.10 Indeed, as Bella’s exclusion portrays, it
neglects even the closest relationships, which many people, irrespective of culture
or national origin, ordinarily regard as incorporated into the fabric of the traditional
nuclear family.11 This unrealistic “one-size-fits-all”12 construction of family fails to
reflect accurately the composition of many Western households13 and ignores other
culturally relevant conceptions of family.14 Because, as will be more fully
developed in Part I, “family unity” embodies one of the core values underlying
U.S. immigration law,15 current constructions of family within the law are
ineffective and make the underlying family unity policy disingenuous.16
This Note argues, as other scholars have, that the construction of family in
immigration law must expand in order to give the family unity policy meaning and
end the law’s contradictory division of families.17 Building on these authors’
works, this Note suggests another solution to the problem: immigration law could
look to the discipline of anthropology for its ethnographic methods and informed
cultural expertise to obtain answers on how to make both the statutory and judicial
analysis of family more flexible. This Note does not propose individualistic,
anthropological analysis in every case but, instead, rejects this approach as too

the story of Sharon, a legal migrant from the Philippines who managed to bring all of her
family to the United States except her twenty-two-year-old daughter, Ellen. Of sixteen
subjects with “U.S.-based parents” whom Professor Rhacel Parreñas interviewed as a part of
her fieldwork, ten shared Ellen’s circumstances. Id. at 144–45.
8. E.g., Jessica Feinberg, The Plus One Policy: An Autonomous Model of Family
Reunification, 11 NEV. L.J. 629, 650 (2011).
9. Id. at 630.
10. Monique Lee Hawthorne, Comment, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening
the Scope of “Family,” 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 819 (2007) (“Because the family
based immigration system is highly restrictive, familial relationships that fall outside the
traditional [Immigration and Nationality Act] definitions of parent or child are unable to
attain family reunification.”).
11. See Feinberg, supra note 8, at 630.
12. Id. at 652.
13. See Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and
Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 290 (2003).
14. See Feinberg, supra note 8, at 642.
15. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 250 (4th ed.
2005). Other notable values underlying immigration law include “protect[ing] . . . the
domestic labor force and . . . the immigration of persons with needed skills.” Fernando
Colon-Navarro, Familia E Inmigración: What Happened to Family Unity?, 19 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 491, 491–92 (2007). National security is also an underlying policy value of U.S.
immigration law. See Demleitner, supra note 13, at 282 n.47 (“Since the terror attacks of
September 11, 2001, immigration has become yet more cumbersome, especially for migrants
from Muslim and Arab countries.”).
16. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 650.
17. See, e.g., id.; Hawthorne, supra note 10; Aubry Holland, Comment, The Modern
Family Unit: Toward a More Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law, 96 CALIF.
L. REV. 1049 (2008).
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costly, contrary to legal processes, and unworkable.18 However, as Professor Eddie
Bruce-Jones explains, “[T]he richness of ethnographic inquiry can, when used to
view law, illuminate new possibilities [of] understanding . . . .”19 This Note posits
that such an understanding, informed by the cultural expertise and methods of
anthropologists, can provide immigration law with the flexibility necessary to give
substance to family unity. This improved elasticity would offer otherwise illegal
immigrants, who come to the United States by reason of family necessity, a more
realistic opportunity to come legally. Because of the costs and dangers associated
with illegal immigration, such a reformulation of immigration law would reduce
illegal immigration.
In Part I, this Note explores the history of U.S. immigration law20—paying
particular attention to family-related provisions—leading up to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952,21 which “established the first comprehensive set of
family-based preferences.”22 Part II then transitions to a discussion of the relevant,
as-amended INA provisions,23 demonstrating American immigration law’s
deleterious impact on the family,24 its failure to account for cultural reality,25 and its
exacerbation of illegal immigration.26 Finally, Part III discusses anthropology and
explains how this discipline can improve family-centric immigration law, an
underlying policy preference that this Note argues should continue to inform this
area of law.27
For simplicity and efficiency, this Note focuses on immigration to the United
States from Mexico, which is the largest sender county in terms of immigrant
numbers.28 Beyond this, anthropology tells that Mexican immigration is largely
driven by familial considerations, a fact that lends itself to the argument herein.29
Together, this high volume and familial focus explicates the problems in current
immigration law’s family provisions, which this Note explores. However, this
Note’s analysis is broadly applicable because immigration law’s family provisions
affect families indiscriminately—many face the same plight as Mexican
immigrants.30

18. See Eddie Bruce-Jones, Anthropology as Critical Legal Intervention?
Instrumentalization, Co-Construction, and Critical Reformulation in the Relationship
Between Anthropology and International Law, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331,
336–37 (2009).
19. Id. at 335 (discussing the application of anthropology to international law).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended beginning at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2012)).
22. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 250.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See YESENIA D. ACOSTA & G. PATRICIA DE LA CRUZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
FOREIGN BORN FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 2010, at 2 (2011) [hereinafter
USCB, FOREIGN BORN], available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-15.pdf.
29. See infra notes 144–53 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Parreñas & Parreñas, supra note 7, at 143–44 (discussing challenges faced
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I: HISTORY
A. A Brief History of Early Immigration Law with a Familial Focus
The history of immigration to the United States is marked by an ebb and flow of
nativistic sentiment, which shaped the respective laws of the time depending on
popular opinion and the level of national xenophobia when passed. With a ready
supply of empty territory, the first one hundred years of the United States’ history
reflected a general policy of open immigration, unencumbered by federal
regulation.31 In fact, official policy in the United States favored unrestricted
immigration.32 The preventative legislation that did exist met near universal
disfavor and expired shortly after enactment.33
From the beginning of the republic, however, factions opposed to free-flowing
immigration existed.34 These groups increasingly gained favor as the republic
neared its centennial, as immigration numbers increased and the immigrant
demographic transformed.35 Despite a growing anti-immigrant sentiment, the need
for cheap labor to facilitate westward expansion largely drowned out the calls for a
restrictive immigration regime until the late 1880s when this same labor-driven
immigration depressed domestic markets.36 As the surge of immigration continued,
bringing immigrants regarded as ethnically and religiously “‘inferior’ and ‘less
desirable,’” Congress gradually expanded exclusionary immigration controls,
specifically targeting particular nationalities.37
This trend foreshadowed the solidification of restrictive immigration policy,
which reached its apex in the years 1917 to 1924 and was reflected in the
Immigration Act of 1924.38 The 1924 law mandated, for the first time, a permanent
quota. Using a national origins formula, it ultimately quantified admissible
immigrants by “the number of persons of their national origin in the United States
in 1920.”39 Importantly, though, the law exempted from the quota “alien wives and
children of American citizens and returning lawful residents”40 provided that the
children were unmarried and under the age of eighteen.41 This exemption reflected
one of the first instances of a family unity policy in a U.S. immigration law.
Although this law largely remained unchanged between the years 1924 and 1952,
by a family from the Philippines).
31. See CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.02–2.04 (2004), reprinted in LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 14–15
[hereinafter, GORDON ET AL., in LEGOMSKY].
32. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A
NUT SHELL 3 (6th ed. 2011).
33. GORDON ET AL., in LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 15 (discussing the Alien Act of
1798, which was permitted to expire after its two-year term).
34. Id.
35. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 5–6.
36. See id. at 6–7 (discussing the rise of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, “quality
control[s],” and head taxes).
37. Id. at 7–10.
38. GORDON ET AL., in LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 16.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 250.
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when Congress enacted the INA, two laws bolstered the presence of familial
categories in immigration law.42 The War Brides Act43 and the Alien Fiancées or
Fiancés Act,44 passed in 1945 and 1946 respectively,45 benefited American World
War II servicemen by admitting their alien spouses, children, and fiancées.46 Under
the laws, 118,000 alien wives and 5000 alien fiancées gained legal admission to the
United States.47
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act and Its Family-Based Preference System
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act, a labyrinth of a
law spanning hundreds of pages and containing twists and turns worthy of an M.
Night Shyamalan film. The Act consolidated fragmented immigration laws, making
one cohesive, although not entirely coherent, statute.48 In addition, it “established
the first comprehensive set of family-based preferences.”49 While Congress has
amended the INA a number of times, and in a variety of ways, its basic structure,
including its system of family preferences, survives essentially intact.50
Significantly, however, Congress amended the Act in 1965, abolishing the
prejudice-driven national origins quotas. In their place, it enacted a tier preference
system principally based on the family unity policy,51 which is readily apparent in
the text of the INA.52 Indeed, in construing the law’s provisions, the Supreme Court
has noted that the INA’s legislative history supports a reading of “congressional
concern . . . directed at the problem of keeping families of United States citizens
and immigrants united.”53 In pursuit of this intent, Congress crafted a family tier

42. GORDON ET AL., in LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 17.
43. Pub. L. No. 271, 59 Stat. 659.
44. Pub. L. No. 471, 60 Stat. 339.
45. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 14.
46. GORDON ET AL., in LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 17.
47. Id.; see also WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 14.
48. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 15.
49. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 250.
50. Id. at 18–21. An updated version of the INA—current through March 4, 2010—can
be found at the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website, http://www.uscis.gov
/portal/site/uscis.
51. GORDON ET AL., in LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 19–20. It would be a gross
understatement to assert that these revisions are the only provisions that the 1965
amendments altered. However, for the purposes of this Note, this oversimplified
characterization suffices. For a more complete discussion of the 1965 amendments to the
INA, see generally id.; see also WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 15–18.
52. Professor Carol Sanger noted three examples of family unity provisions in an
influential article: “[n]umerically unrestricted admissions for immediate relatives of United
States citizens, immigrant preference categories based on degrees of kinship, and
suspensions of deportation based on hardship to immediate relatives who are citizens or
permanent residents.” Carol Sanger, Immigration Reform and Control of the Undocumented
Family, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 295, 296 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
53. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 85-119, at 7 (1957)); see also Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 814–15
(quoting Fiallo). As Hawthorne documents, several other courts have discussed the INA’s
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system with six levels, ultimately divided into two groups: those relationships not
subject to numerical limitations (one level) and those that are (five levels).54
1. The First Group: Those Relationships Exempted from All Numerical Limitations
The first group—that is, those relationships exempted from numerical limitations
of any kind—has only one tier and concerns “immediate relatives” of U.S. citizens.55
These relationships include citizens’ “children, spouses, and parents”56 provided that
relatives in this category satisfy certain qualifications.57 For example, despite
including under its umbrella a mostly comprehensive list of parent-child
relationships, the law strays from notions of inclusion and limits the scope of this
category to embrace only those individuals who are both unmarried and under the age
of twenty-one.58 In other words, when the biological offspring of a U.S. citizen turns
twenty-one, the INA ceases to define that person as a child, and instead, defines him
or her as an “unmarried son[] or daughter[].”59 As the reader will see, this change in
preference category has serious consequences for family reunification.
One cannot automatically sponsor a parent for immigration under this provision;
in order to do so, the requesting citizen must be at least twenty-one-years-old.60 This
limitation results from congressional fear of “anchor babies,” an imagined
phenomenon where immigrants come to the United States to have children, which
serve as “anchors” for the undocumented parent based on birthright citizenship.61

legislative concern with the family. See id. at 815 (discussing Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620
F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he INA has a ‘humane purpose . . . to reunite families.’”);
Degado v. INS, 473 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The rule adopted . . . ignores ‘the
foremost policy underlying the granting of preference visas under our immigration laws, the
reunification of families . . . .’”) (quoting Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1977)).
54. See Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of
Family: Toward a Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental
Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 525–26 & n.54 (2010).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
56. Id.
57. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 631.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A)–(G) (2012).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (2012). See infra notes 104–112 and accompanying text.
60. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Courts have held that this provision does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause even though it distinguishes between children over twenty-one-years-of-age
and under twenty-one-years-of-age. See, e.g., Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir.
1969).
61. See David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward a More ChildCentered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 83–84 (2006). For a comprehensive
discussion of the term “anchor baby” and the legal implications of birthright citizenship, see
generally Mariana E. Ormonde, Comment, Debunking the Myth of the “Anchor Baby”: Why
Proposed Legislation Limiting Birthright Citizenship Is Not a Means of Controlling
Unauthorized Immigration, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 861 (2012). In her anthropological
research, Boehm also noted that the fear of anchor babies is unfounded. See BOEHM, INTIMATE
MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 141 (“[T]he Mexican migrants I work with do not go to the
United States to have children who will be U.S. citizens—in fact, over the course of my
research no parent has expressed their motivations to migrate in these terms . . . .”).
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The first group also includes one other narrow group of relatives—“[a]liens born
to an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence during a temporary visit
abroad.”62
2. The Second Group: Those Relationships That Are Subject to
Numerical Limitations
The second group contains those familial relationships that are subject to
numerical limitations in terms of both overall restrictions and per-country ceilings
on immigration.63 In terms of family preference categories subject to numerical
limitation, U.S. law caps total admissions at 480,000.64 However, this 480,000
allotment is reduced by the amount of numerically exempt immediate-relative
admissions (the first group described above), provided that the nonexempt
“family-sponsored immigration quota must be at least 226,000.”65 Because
immediate-relative admissions from the first group almost always exceed
254,000,66 the family-sponsored quota seldom exceeds the 226,000 statutory
floor.67 For example, in 2009 alone, 536,000 immediate relatives immigrated to the
United States.68 Stated differently, while the second group theoretically allows for a
total admission of 480,000 immigrants, as a result of the reduction that occurs
because of the numerically exempt admissions, the actual number of admissions
under this tier is actually substantially lower.69 Almost always, this number is no
greater than the statutory floor: 226,000.70 Furthermore, these family preference
categories are also generally constrained by per-country quotas as well, which
never exceed 26,260.71 In essence, the law subjects these family preference
categories to quotas because it deems these relationships, discussed immediately
below, to be less persuasive for the purposes of family reunification.72
As indicated earlier, this second group of family relationships has four
overarching levels, of which one level is further subdivided into two sublevels.73
The State Department’s Visa Bulletin, the purpose of which is to indicate “how
long ago the people who are now about to receive visas first applied,”74 labels the

62. § 1151(b)(2)(B).
63. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 150–54.
64. Id. at 152–53.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 153. The number of nonexempt preference visas consumed by exempt
immediate-relative visas is 254,000, or the 480,000 immigrant cap reduced by the 226,000
statutory floor.
67. Id.
68. Evelyn H. Cruz, Because You’re Mine, I Walk the Line: The Trials and Tribulations
of the Family Visa Program, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 156 (2010). There is one exception
for the 2A preference category. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
69. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 32, at 152–53.
70. Id.
71. Cruz, supra note 68, at 156–57.
72. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 250.
73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)–(4) (2012); VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6,
at 2.
74. LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 251.
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four overarching levels in order of preference: F1, F2, F3, and F4.75 It further
divides the F2 level into two subparts, which it labels F2A and F2B respectively.76
Hence, this second group has a total of five levels: F1, F2A, F2B, F3, and F4.
The first family-sponsored preference category (F1) applies to the “[u]nmarried
sons and daughters [over twenty-one-years-of-age] of citizens.”77 The second
preference category is divided into two subcategories, to which the law allocates
seventy-seven percent of the total number of visas for this preference category to
the first subcategory (F2A) and twenty-three percent to the second subcategory
(F2B).78 Preference category F2A governs the immigration of “the spouses [and]
children” of lawful permanent residents (LPRs);79 seventy-five percent of the visas
allocated to F2A do not count against the per-country quotas.80 Meanwhile,
preference category F2B regulates the admission of “the unmarried sons [and]
unmarried daughters (but [who] are not the children)” of LPRs.81 The third
family-sponsored preference category (F3) applies to the “[m]arried sons and
married daughters of citizens,”82 and the fourth (F4) governs the “[b]rothers and
sisters of citizens.”83 As when sponsoring a parent, however, the citizen attempting
to sponsor a sibling must have attained twenty-one-years-of-age.84
Finally, the INA attempts to avoid family separation by conferring upon the
spouses and children of migrants, if not otherwise entitled to a visa, “derivative
immigration status.”85 This essentially means that, if the derivative beneficiary is
“accompanying or following to join” her spouse or parent (the primary
beneficiary), the INA regards her as having the same family preference status as the
primary beneficiary.86 Having derivative status entitles the beneficiary of that
condition to the same waiting period as the primary beneficiary.87 However, like
the law’s other provisions, derivative status is also limited in that the INA only
allows it to extend for one generation.88

75. See, e.g., VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2.
76. Id.
77. § 1153(a)(1); see also VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2.
78. § 1153(a)(2); see also VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2.
79. § 1153(a)(2)(A); see also VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(4)(A) (2012); see also VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6,
at 2.
81. § 1153(a)(2)(B); see also VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2. “Children”
here refers to the INA’s statutory definition of child, not the biological understanding of
“children.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2012) (containing the statutory definition of “child”
used by the INS).
82. § 1153(a)(3).
83. § 1153(a)(4).
84. Id.
85. Colon-Navarro, supra note 15, at 498; see also § 1153(d).
86. § 1153(d); see also Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 817.
87. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 817.
88. Thronson, supra note 61, at 71.
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II: IMMIGRATION LAW’S FAILED SUPPORT FOR FAMILY UNITY
A. The INA’s Limited Definition of Family
The INA’s failure to effectuate its own policy of family unity is well
documented and is the subject of much scholarship.89 This Part builds upon existing
scholarship and further demonstrates this failure, paying particular attention to
immigration law’s petitioning provisions.90 It does so to frame the need for a
comprehensive solution to the problem. The INA’s very first family-based
preference category, immediate relatives, demonstrates the inherent problems with
the way immigration law attempts to realize its policy of family unity. The law too
narrowly defines family,91 a problematic truth in light of the fact that family
inherently drives immigration to the United States from Mexico,92 the largest
sender country in terms of immigrant numbers.93
Ignoring momentarily the INA’s limited definition of “children,” the law
excludes a host of family relationships because it conceives of the family “as a
nuclear family, consisting of mother, father and one or more (biological or adopted)
minor children.”94 As one scholar has aptly observed, “Only . . . married couples,
certain categories of parents and children, and siblings may reunite; no other
relationships, however important or valuable, qualify.”95 In addition to some types
of intimate partners, the law excludes a number of extended family relationships,
including grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, and nephews.96 This is the
case even if one of the excluded persons acts in loco parentis over a child or if one
is a part of what scholars have called “functional families.”97 Through this lens,
immigration law appears completely intransigent,98 and its policies seem “less

89. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 13; Thronson, supra note 61.
90. By “petitioning provisions,” this Note refers to those areas of the law governing
requests by a U.S. citizen or LPR (the “petitioner”) to bring his or her relative (the
“beneficiary”) to the United States. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 157.
91. See, e.g., Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 819.
92. See Boehm, For My Children, supra note 1, at 780 (“[I]n San Marcos the
motivations to migrate almost always center on children. . . . An ethnographic view of
negotiations within families reveals how intimate relations motivate and guide global
migrations, directly linking kin relations to broader global processes.”).
93. See USCB, FOREIGN BORN, supra note 28, at 2 (“The single largest country-of-birth
group was from Mexico (29 percent of all foreign born).”).
94. Demleitner, supra note 13, at 290.
95. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 635. Until recently, only those in opposite-sex marriages
could petition for their spouses. Id. However, with the recent decision in United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services now considers
petitions from same-sex married couples, even if the petitioner lives in a State that does not
recognize that marriage. See Same-Sex Marriages, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES
(July 1, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/family/same-sex-marriages.
96. Demleitner, supra note 14, at 290–91.
97. Functional families are family “formations which may not satisfy [the INA’s]
narrow conception of family, but satisfy the care-taking needs of children.” King, supra note
54, at 510–12 & n.5 (listing scholarship).
98. See Feinberg, supra note 8, at 631.
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aimed at the overall goal of family unification and more at judging which
households constitute true families and which do not.”99 Because of this
fundamental disconnect between stated policy and apparent reality,100 the family
unity policy is disingenuous.101 This is especially true when one considers that the
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the extended family in other
contexts.102
The INA’s implausibly narrow definition of “children,” a definition that the
Supreme Court has held to be exclusive,103 contributes to immigration law’s current
inadequacy. Consider again Iván’s allegory at the beginning of this Note and a few
hypothetical situations related to his family’s circumstances.
Assuming first that Iván naturalized as a U.S. citizen,104 four of his children—
those that were unmarried and under twenty-one-years-of-age—fell into the
immediate-relative preference category, meaning that the INA exempted their visas
from all numerical limitations.105 This being the case, the law allowed these four
children to immigrate immediately upon approval of their visas.106 Bella, however,
turned twenty-one-years-old prior to Iván’s petitioning for his family.107
Accordingly, despite the fact that Bella is Iván’s biological offspring, the INA no
longer considers Bella to be his child.108 On her twenty-first birthday, Bella ceased
to be Iván’s “child” and became an “unmarried daughter” under the law.109 In
September 2013, Bella’s change in preference status—from immediate relative to
F1 (unmarried daughter)—came laden with enormous consequences. Instead of

99. Holland, supra note 17, at 1059.
100. Despite its family unity policy, immigration law takes no account of “individual
circumstances . . . [and] unilaterally and categorically” determines the value of familial
relationships. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 634.
101. Id. at 650.
102. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). In
this case, Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, noted that the United States’
family fabric “is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family[.] The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.” Id. at 504.
103. See INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 90–91 (1986).
104. Remember that Boehm does not tell whether Iván obtained citizenship or maintained
LPR status. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 61.
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
106. Cruz, supra note 68, at 158 n.15.
107. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 61. “Aging out” (where the
beneficiary turns twenty-one after a petition is filed but before a visa is granted) is not a
problem for immediate relatives. The Child Status Protection Act of 2002 (CSPA), Pub. L.
No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), freezes the age of the
immediate-relative beneficiary at the age of the beneficiary on the date of the petition’s
filing. See § 1151(f)(1); LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 251–52. Aging out, however, remains
a problem for the children of LPRs. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1) (2012); LEGOMSKY, supra
note 15, at 251–53.
108. BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 61.
109. § 1153(a)(1).
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waiting only a matter of months, or even a few years, to immigrate,110 as her four
younger siblings did, Bella would have to wait two decades. In fact, in order for a
visa to become available for her priority date111 in September 2013, Iván must have
petitioned for her no later than September 8, 1993.112 Thus, today, a person in
Bella’s situation faces separation from her family for a duration of approximately
twenty years.
Regardless of age, the situation becomes more problematic when the
consequences of marriage are thrown into the mix. Continuing to assume that Iván
has naturalized, further suppose that he petitioned for his family before Bella’s
twenty-first birthday. In this situation, if Bella wished to maintain her
immediate-relative preference status, she must “put her life on hold”; she cannot
marry.113 If Bella married, she would forfeit her immediate-relative preference and
her ability to immigrate upon the completed processing of her visa.114 Instead, the
INA would move her into the F3 preference category, “[m]arried sons and married
daughters of citizens.”115 As a result, for Bella to immigrate in September 2013,
Iván must have filed her petition no later than May 15, 1993.116 Even if Bella
married after turning twenty-one years old—meaning that she moved from the F1
preference category (unmarried daughter of a U.S. citizen) to the F3 preference
category (married daughter of a U.S. citizen)—despite the relatively slight
discrepancy in current waiting times between the two categories,117 this could still
pose a problem for Bella and her family because waiting times cannot be predicted

110. Cf. Demleitner, supra note 13, at 282 (“[A]dministrative delays separate married
couples at least for a number of months, and sometimes even years, even if one of the
partners is a citizen . . . .”). This Note does not intend to demean the hardship inflicted upon
a family by a several month or several year separation caused by administrative delays in the
immigration process; in fact, its thesis recognizes all familial separation as difficult. Instead,
this “short” waiting time is simply offered as a contrast to the significantly longer waiting
times that follow other preference categories.
111. A priority date is the date on which the petitioner files the first relevant immigration
document. On the Visa Bulletin, it indicates the person(s) next in line for a visa. LEGOMSKY,
supra note 15, at 251; see also VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2.
112. See VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2. Additionally, because Bella is
not a “child” under the INA, her mother cannot bestow derivative status on her. 8 U.S.C. §
1153(d) (2012). Bella’s wait was substantially the same in December 2012. In order for her
priority date to receive a visa at that time, Iván would have had to petition for Bella no later
than July 1, 1993. See 9 U.S. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE, VISA
BULLETIN, NO. 51, at 2 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter VISA BULLETIN, Dec. 2012], available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/visabulletin_december2012.pdf.
113. Parreñas & Parreñas, supra note 7, at 144; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2012)
(defining a child as “unmarried”).
114. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 158 n.15.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (2012).
116. See VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2. For Bella to have immigrated in
December 2012, Iván must have filed her petition no later than March 1, 1993. See VISA
BULLETIN, Dec. 2012, supra note 112, at 2.
117. See VISA BULLETIN, Dec. 2012, supra note 112, at 2. The priority date for the F1
category is July 1, 1993, while the priority date for the F3 category is March 1, 1993, a
difference of four months.
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with any degree of certainty.118 For instance, in September 2013, the F2A category,
which covers the spouses and children of LPRs, was current, meaning that visas
were granted when processed.119 Indeed, August 2013 marked the first time that
this category had been current in a number of years.120 To contrast, in December
2012, the waiting time for the Mexican spouse or child of a LPR (F2A) was two
years, four months.121 In August 2009, this period was considerably longer: nearly
seven years.122
In general, the issue of family separation becomes further exacerbated if the
petitioner does not have citizenship but is, instead, an LPR. Assuming now,
therefore, that Iván is an LPR and not a citizen, his entire family would then likely
face prolonged separation from their father, not just Bella (however, the length of
Bella’s separation from Iván would still be far longer than any of her other family
members).123 If Iván is an LPR, the INA then places his wife and four unmarried
children under twenty-one-years-of-age into the F2A preference category.124 Bella,
meanwhile, who would find herself in the F2B category (unmarried daughter of at
least twenty-one-years-of-age of a LPR) would, in September 2013, face a waiting
time of just under twenty years.125 Assuming, for whatever reason, Iván’s inability
to travel to Mexico to visit his daughter and further assuming that his family does
not act outside of the law, if Iván petitioned for Bella on her twenty-first birthday,
he would not see her until she was forty-one-years-old.126
While twenty years of separation seems both appalling and paradoxical in light
of a law that claims family unity as an underlying policy, Bella’s situation can get
worse. If she marries, irrespective of age, the provisions of the INA permanently
separate her from her family. The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) only speaks of the
“[m]arried sons and married daughters of citizens”; the Act conspicuously omits the

118. Cruz, supra note 68, at 158; see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 15, at 251 (“The Visa
Office Bulletin tells us only how long those who are now receiving visas had to wait. . . .
That doesn’t necessarily tell us how long those who are initiating the process today will have
to wait. On the demand side, perhaps an unusually high (or low) number of applications for a
particular country/preference combination have been filed since the priority date displayed in
the chart. And on the supply side, the various statutory formulas . . . cause the numerical
ceilings to change from year to year.”) (emphasis in original).
119. See VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2.
120. See 9 U.S. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN, NO. 59,
at 2 (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/visabulletin
_august2013.pdf.
121. See VISA BULLETIN, Dec. 2012, supra note 112, at 2.
122. 11 U.S. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN, NO. 11
(Aug. 2009) [hereinafter VISA BULLETIN, Aug. 2009], available at http://www.travel.state
.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_4539.html; Cruz, supra note 68, at 158.
123. See VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2 (giving the priority dates for the
different family-based preference categories).
124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (2012); VISA BULLETIN, Dec. 2012, supra note 112, at
2; see also supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
125. See VISA BULLETIN, Sept. 2013, supra note 6, at 2. In December 2012, Bella would
have waited just over twenty years. See VISA BULLETIN, Dec. 2012, supra note 112, at 2.
126. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 160–62 (discussing restrictions on short-term travel); see
also infra notes 164−70 and accompanying text.
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married sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents.127 As a married woman,
the law would permanently sever Bella from her mother, father, and siblings, no
longer considering her to be a member of that family.
Finally, the INA makes one more subtle, though meaningful, distinction in LPR
families. The law exempts the children born to LPRs “during a temporary visit
abroad” from all numerical limitations, but as noted, does not exempt any other
children of LPRs from these limitations.128 Straying from the Iván/Bella allegory,
assume that the waiting times for the F2A preference category match those of
Mexico for August 2009, meaning that the spouses and children of LPRs would
have to wait approximately seven years for a visa.129 If a Mexican LPR gave birth
to a child while temporarily visiting her other children abroad, assuming that she
could overcome the restrictions on short-term travel,130 this child would be
immediately admissible upon approval of its visa petition while her other children
would have to continue their wait for a visa. This is because the newborn child
would be covered by the “Aliens not subject to direct numerical limitations”
preference category,131 whereas the LPR’s other children would be subject to the
F2A preference limitations.132
B. The INA Fails to Embrace Culture and Reality
As can easily be seen from the preceding sections, one of the primary problems
with the INA’s family construct is that it “views adult, married children as no
longer part of the family but instead as having their own, separate family.”133 LPR
families find this especially problematic given that no reunification right with their
married children exists at all.134 This view emphatically defies many family
structures, both in terms of other cultural conceptions of family135 and conceptions
of the “traditional” U.S. family.136 Its exclusion of relationships that many regard as
“immediate” simply cannot peacefully coexist against a policy of family unity. As
one scholar has skillfully argued, “When a government chooses to adopt a strong
family reunification policy, it must follow through by recognizing that ‘family’
cannot be limited to a statute’s narrow view of who is and who is not ‘family,’
when society itself reflects different models than those embodied in the statute.”137
Anthropology teaches that many cultures that extensively immigrate to the
United States—including Latin American and, more specifically, Mexican,
culture—adhere to significantly different views of family from those promulgated

127. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(B) (2012).
129. See VISA BULLETIN, Aug. 2009, supra note 122.
130. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 160–62 (discussing restrictions on short-term travel); see
also infra notes 164−70 and accompanying text.
131. § 1151(b).
132. § 1153(a)(2)(A).
133. Demleitner, supra note 13, at 290.
134. See § 1153(a)(3); see also infra note 127 and accompanying text.
135. See Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 818.
136. See id. at 815.
137. Id. at 824.
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into American immigration law.138 This means that, as a result of the INA’s narrow,
unrealistic definition of family, many immigrants lack the ability to petition for
relatives with whom they have close familial relations.139 Much of this problem
stems from the fact that U.S. law evaluates an immigrant as an individual instead of
as a member of a family unit.140 However, an immigrant often principally bases her
identity on the relationships that she cultivates with other family members.141
Indeed, extended family members, whom the INA excludes entirely from its
family-based preference categories, play active roles in family life in cultures all
over the world.142
For instance, the Mexican family is the primary component of that culture,143
which places a high emphasis on maintaining close relationships with members of
the extended family.144 Mexicans, who make up the bulk of foreign-born
immigrants in America,145 “generally consider extended family members to be as
important to their daily lives as immediate family members,”146 and sizeable
extended families are the norm in Latin America.147 Their notion of family
embraces relationships as removed as aunts, uncles, cousins, and even godparents,
making what that culture regards as the family unit considerably different from
INA expectations.148 Furthermore, in rural Mexico, where patrilocal living
arrangements predominate, extended families frequently live in close proximity, if
not together, in multigenerational households.149 Families continue to act on this
preference today in Mexico and, as members relocate, in the United States.150

138. This Note does not seek to stereotype the Mexican family or any other cultural
construct of family; instead, it offers generalizations. As Dr. Geri-Ann Galanti has written,
the difference between the two is that “[a] stereotype is an ending point; a generalization is a
beginning point.” Geri-Ann Galanti, The Hispanic Family and Male-Female Relationships:
An Overview, 14 J. TRANSCULTURAL NURSING 180, 180 (2003) (citation omitted). The
difference, she explains, lies in the intended use of the information. Stereotypes are not
associated with positive treatment, whereas a generalization can serve a beneficial purpose
“[b]ecause it can help us understand and anticipate behavior.” Id. at 181. In this light, this
Note employs the use of generalizations in order to further demonstrate the shortcomings in
domestic immigration law and to frame the issue for an anthropological solution. In short,
anthropology, through its cultural expertise, can help Congress understand and anticipate
migrant motivations and behaviors. In turn, this will lead to a better-informed immigration
law with a more inclusive definition of family that will ultimately decrease illegal
immigration. See infra Part III.
139. See Feinberg, supra note 8, at 642. Feinberg explores a number of these
relationships in depth. See generally id. at 641–50.
140. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 821.
141. Id.
142. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 648.
143. Galanti, supra note 138, at 181.
144. The Mexican Transnational Experience in South Bend, 3 INST. FOR LATINO STUDIES,
UNIV. NOTRE DAME 1, 2 (2009).
145. See USCB, FOREIGN BORN, supra note 28, at 2.
146. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 649.
147. Galanti, supra note 138, at 181.
148. Id.
149. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 42 (“Today, for example,
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Bella’s situation demonstrates these conclusions. Instead of beginning her own
household upon separation from her family, she went to live with her
grandmother.151 Anthropologist Dr. Deborah A. Boehm described the separation of
Bella from her family:
Iván said that this [separation] was a cause of serious stress for his
family, particularly because it is common for children in rural Mexico
to live with their parents until they marry. The construct of a twentyone-year-old as an adult who should live independent of her parents is
problematic within Mexican families and does not accurately reflect
how Mexican (im)migrants [sic] think about family.152
Moreover, as this evidently close relationship with a grandparent reveals, many
immigrants find frustrating the complete exclusion of grandparents from the INA’s
family preference categories, making it altogether impossible for a grandchild to
legally bring her grandparent to the United States.153 This is especially true if they,
like Bella, come from a culture that defines the traditional family as
multigenerational.154
A failure to give meaning to other cultural conceptions of family is one problem;
however, the U.S. conception of family in immigration law does not even reflect
modern notions of the “traditional” American family.155 Indeed, notions of the
traditional family are entirely inapposite for a generation.156 In recent years, U.S.
households have come to include family members that themselves fall outside the
INA family preference categories.157 In fact, most Americans reside in non-nuclear
households that fail to reflect the “nuclear family model of a wage-earner husband,
homemaker wife, and their biological children, all sharing one domicile.”158
C. Legal/Illegal Implications of the Failed Family Unity Policy
American immigration policy prompts prolonged family separation, an
experience with considerable deleterious consequences for those families who must
[because of immigration] mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law often live under one roof
without their husbands . . . .”). “Patrilocal” refers to the living arrangement where “sons and
daughters-in-law buil[d] homes on or adjacent to the [son’s] extended family compound, and
daughters move[] to the homes of their husbands.” Id. With patrilocality, kinship is “traced
from fathers to sons,” and the arrangement reflects “meaningful family relations.” Id.
150. Id. (“This desire or ideal to maintain close geographic proximity of kin—albeit in
new gendered forms—continues to define family structures in the U.S.-Mexico
transnation.”).
151. Id. at 61.
152. Id.
153. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 827.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 815.
156. See Demleitner, supra note 13, at 290.
157. Id.
158. King, supra note 54, at 522 (quoting Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends
on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional”
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 570 (1996)).
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navigate this hardship.159 Moreover, the division of families significantly increases
the incidence of illegal immigration.
In one way or another, immigration is almost always inextricably tied to and
impelled by family. As one anthropologist explains, “[P]eople migrate to support
family, to reunite with family, and/or with financial and social resources from
family members.”160 Moreover, family networks of migration make subsequent
migrations by other family members more commonplace and more successful.161
Put together, prolonged family separation, in combination with the lack of any real
opportunity to come to the United States through legal channels, increases illegal
immigration to the United States.
Many families that experience the prolonged separation resulting from the
severely truncated definition of family in U.S. immigration law are overcome by
their need to be with loved ones, motivating new illegal immigration and sustained
illegal residence.162 In effect, these immigrants believe that their family ties leave
them with no option but to come to or remain in the United States illegally.163
Sometimes this decision relates to the family’s finances, if, for example, the
immigrant is the family’s breadwinner,164 which at times has become espoused with
idealistic notions of masculinity.165 Other times, immigrants regard living in the
United States without legal status as a lesser moral harm than abandoning one’s
family.166 Consequently, deportation, even when combined with substantial prison
sentences, has had little deterrent effect on family-related immigration,167 which is

159. See Colon-Navarro, supra note 15, at 495–96.
160. BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 33.
161. See Paul Winters, Alain de Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, Family and Community
Networks in Mexico-U.S. Migration, 36 J. HUM. RESOURCES 159, 160 (2001).
162. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 157.
163. See id. at 166.
164. Id. at 167. Evidence suggests that this is often the case. In documenting the gendered
nature of migrations, Professor Boehm, for instance, tells that, for Mexicans:
(Im)migration [sic] and transnational movement [to the United States] impact
what it means to be a man, what is appropriate masculine behavior, and how
men are judged in both sending and receiving communities. . . . No longer able
to support their families as they have in the past, men go to the United States to
fulfill their role as providers, or stay in Mexico and are reminded of how their
work in the milpas cannot financially maintain a household. Masculinized
migration is driven by economic necessity. . . . Increasingly, to be a man, one
must migrate.
BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 73 (emphasis in original). Moreover,
according to a recent report by the Pew Hispanic Center, net migration from Mexico recently
flatlined and may have even reversed. The group attributes this, at least in part, to the
weakened U.S. economy, especially in terms of the housing construction markets. Jeffrey S.
Passel, D’Vera Cohn & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—
and Perhaps Less, PEW HISP. CENTER (May 3, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04
/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/.
165. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 73.
166. Cruz, supra note 68, at 167.
167. See Demleitner, supra note 13, at 295.
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illustrated by the ever-growing number of petitions to change the legal status of
undocumented migrants already residing illegally in the United States.168
The lack of any real opportunity for short-term travel in order to visit relatives
abroad or to obtain temporary visas in the interim exacerbates this trend. Although
a petitioning LPR can travel to visit a relative living abroad—ignoring expense
altogether—immigration law only allows for short furloughs from the United
States. Prolonged absences affect one’s admissibility to the United States and one’s
ability to naturalize as a citizen.169 If an immigrant travels to visit her family abroad
and sojourns outside of the United States for a period longer than 180 days, upon
returning, the law regards that person as attempting to make a new admission to the
country and, therefore, subjects her to inadmissibility.170 Moreover, a LPR wishing
to naturalize must spend half of the required five year residence-eligibility period
physically present in the United States, and LPRs who leave the country from
anywhere between six to twelve months jeopardize their compliance with the
continuous presence requirement.171
Nor are separated beneficiary relatives generally eligible for temporary visas to
assuage the hardship caused by the often-prolonged division.172 As Professor
Evelyn H. Cruz explains, in order to legally travel to the United States on a
temporary basis, one must qualify for a nonimmigrant visa.173 This requires one to
establish a lack of “immigrant intent.”174 Dispelling the presumption of immigrant
intent—a presumption that applies equally to applications for tourist visas—
requires the immigrant to prove that he or she does not plan on coming to the
United States with the purpose of remaining here.175 Obviously, when one has an
application pending for a permanent visa, this showing is difficult, if not
impossible. As a result, family members waiting to secure a family-preference
immigrant visa have substantial difficulty obtaining temporary visas because
consulates regularly use the “nonimmigrant intent” requirement to deny the
nonimmigrant visa requests.176 If a family member fails to disclose the pending
family-preference visa request, however, that individual “risk[s] being denied
admission at the port of entry, subjected to expedited removal, or accused of
misrepresentation when they apply for immigrant status.”177 These requirements,
then, translate to a policy that basically requires the disruption of family;178 an LPR
must remain separated from her family until her qualified family members’ priority

168. Cruz, supra note 68, at 163.
169. Id. at 161.
170. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii) (2012); Cruz, supra note 68, at 161.
171. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 316.5(c) (2011); Cruz, supra note 68, at
161–62.
172. Cruz, supra note 68, at 160–61.
173. Id. at 160.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 160 n.34 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2012)).
176. Id. at 160.
177. Id. at 160−61.
178. See id. at 162.
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dates are eligible for visas, a daunting prospect for these kin.179 As discussed, this
could be several decades.180
As a result of this de facto family separation policy, immigrants feel compelled
to circumvent the law.181 However, the decision to come to the United States
illegally “complicates or even eliminates their opportunity to regularize their
immigration status”182 because of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),183 a law passed by Congress in 1996 that amended the
INA by adding to it a number of immigration penalties in an effort to deter illegal
residence in the United States.184 Scholars have accused Congress of deliberately
undermining the family unity policy with the IIRIRA,185 and the law’s several
provisions substantiate these arguments. Essentially, the law creates a series of
“bars” to admission into the United States for those immigrants who enter and
remain in the United States illegally. The first applies to immigrants who remain
unlawfully in the United States for more than 180 days but less than one year. If an
immigrant leaves the United States—voluntarily or forcibly—within this window,
the law provides that she is inadmissible for three years following the departure.186
If, however, an immigrant remains illegally present for longer than one year and
subsequently departs—again, voluntarily or forcibly—she is then inadmissible for
ten years.187 If either immigrant subsequently reenters the United States illegally
during the period of her respective bar, she is then permanently inadmissible.188
These immigration penalties arise out of what Professor David Thronson calls
“the myth of ‘the line.’”189 Popular estimation reasons that a legal “line” into the
country exists, and while the line may be longer today than in the past, resulting in
longer waiting times, prospective immigrants who wait patiently will eventually
obtain legal admission to the United States.190 While theoretically true, Thronson
explains that the fallacy inherent in this argument is easily exposed when one
considers the sizeable barriers erected in the paths of families seeking legal
immigration, “which make it difficult or even impossible to get here (legally),
especially when the family already is here (physically).”191

179. See id. at 160.
180. See, e.g., supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
181. Cf. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 819 (“This hopelessness for a complete legal
family reunification . . . drives some families toward finding avenues for illegal immigration
and, as a result, creates mixed-status families.”).
182. Cruz, supra note 68, at 166.
183. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at scattered provisions of 8
U.S.C.).
184. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 166.
185. See generally, e.g., Colon-Navarro, supra note 15 (arguing that provisions of the
IIRIRA undermine family unity and proposing an amendment that would exempt immediate
relatives from the same).
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2012); Cruz, supra note 68, at 166.
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); Cruz, supra note 68, at 166.
188. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C); Cruz, supra note 68, at 166.
189. Thronson, supra note 61, at 67.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also supra Part II.A.
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The IIRIRA penalty provisions demonstrate Thronson’s argument. While the
problems with this law are multifaceted, they arise primarily in the second stage of
the immigration process, which determines the jurisdiction where the immigrant
applies for an immigrant visa after his or her priority date reaches the top of the
list.192 As shown, long waiting times for visas often separate families for years,
provoking evasion of the legal process.193 Therefore, instead of petitioning for a
visa outside the United States, family members petition for a change in legal status
within the United States.194 Like other family visa petitions, this requires a
determination of jurisdiction—there are two: (1) United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) offices, located in the United States; or (2) the U.S.
consulate located abroad in the beneficiary’s country of origin—at which the
beneficiary will apply for the visa.195 Effectively, however, undocumented family
members are consigned to the latter jurisdiction.196 Consequently, family
beneficiaries must depart the United States to apply for a permanent visa in their
country of origin; their departures frequently trigger the bars under the IIRIRA.197
Although one can, in theory, obtain a waiver of the inadmissibility bars, the request
for the waiver must also be submitted and adjudicated at the consulate in the
immigrant’s country of origin, meaning that this process also elicits the IIRIRA
bars.198 The decision process takes several months and waivers are not easily
obtained.199
In light of the effective non-navigability of this process, many immigrants forgo
it all together, believing that departing the United States for a visa is not worth the
risk.200 In fact, these provisions do not even successfully encourage undocumented
family members to leave the United States.201 The IIRIRA, in combination with a

192. Cruz, supra note 68, at 158. Professor Cruz explains that the family visa petition
process contains three steps: (1) the petitioner submits a visa application for a relative
beneficiary; (2) when the beneficiary’s priority date reaches the top of the list, a
determination is made about where, geographically, that person applies for the visa; and (3)
the beneficiary must establish that he or she is not inadmissible to the United States. Id. at
157–59. A beneficiary can be ineligible for a number of reasons, one of which is a prior
immigration violation under the IIRIRA. Id. at 159.
193. See, e.g., supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
194. See Colon-Navarro, supra note 15, at 493.
195. Cruz, supra note 68, at 158–59.
196. See id. at 159. In order to submit the application to the local USCIS office, the
immigrant must either be in the United States legally or be “the beneficiary of a family
petition filed before January 14, 1998 or April 30, 2001 . . . [and] have been present in the
United States on December 21, 2000.” Id. Both categories are extremely limited. Any person
who does not fall into either category does not qualify for USCIS jurisdiction and must
submit her application abroad, irrespective of that person’s physical, though albeit illegal,
residence in the United States. Id.
197. See id. at 167.
198. See id. at 167 n.79.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 167.
Perversely, the statutory provisions meant to encourage compliance with the
law may have encouraged the opposite: People wait in the United States hoping
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failed family unity policy and increased border control, has made illegal
immigration to the United States, ironically, both more probable and more
dangerous.202 However, rather than stemming the flow of illegal immigrants into
the country,203 these policies have exacerbated the problems of illegal immigration.
Professor Bernard Trujillo has labeled this phenomenon “northern capture.”204
Northern capture relates to a bent of migration called “return migration” where a
migrant enters the host country, often to work, and then returns to her country of
origin after a period.205 Because of the difficulties of navigating the legal
immigration system, enhanced border control in the United States has interrupted
return migration, which would otherwise occur in the natural immigration cycle.206
Accordingly, immigrants come to the United States and stay for longer durations to
avoid the increasing dangers inherent in immigration.207 Professor Boehm’s
anthropological research corroborates this hypothesis. She found that Mexican
immigrants would prefer to “go and come” from the United States, establishing
lives that transcend the border,208 and discovered that illegal immigrants stay in the
United States for longer durations, especially in the post-9/11 political climate.209
Perhaps more significantly, Professor Boehm observed that despite the increasingly
difficult task it has become to reunite families, this does not stop immigrants from
nevertheless trying, even if that means flouting immigration law altogether and
facing the dangers that come packaged with that choice.210
III. KEEPING FAMILY BUT CHANGING “FAMILY”
This Note has demonstrated that the family unity policy in U.S. immigration law
relies on a severely circumscribed and unrealistic definition of “family” that
subverts the goals it purports to value.211 American immigration law separates
immigrants from loved ones for months, years, and, sometimes, even

for a method of legalizing or adjusting status rather than leaving the United
States and triggering the bar. Rather than returning to their country and filing
for a waiver, they choose to forego the process and remain in the United States
with their families, even if it means remaining in illegal status. The effects of
this provision are to separate U.S. citizens and LPRs from their immediate
relatives in contradiction to the long-standing purpose of family reunification,
and to encourage illegal immigration.
Colon-Navarro, supra note 15, at 495–96 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
202. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 10; Cruz, supra note 68 at 163.
203. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 163 (“The number of applications for [change in status
of] undocumented family members is growing . . . .”).
204. Bernard Trujillo, Mexican Families & United States Immigration Reform, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 415, 423 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 3.
209. Id. at 35.
210. Id. at 35, 74.
211. See supra Part II.A.
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permanently.212 Consequently, immigrants thwart immigration law and reunite their
families illegally.213 In the words of one scholar, “A long wait without a clear end
results in families reunifying by other means, and the desire of . . . families to
remain together eclipses the consequences of living in the shadows of U.S.
society.”214 Clearly then, if family serves as the primary stimulant of immigration
and if the definition of family in U.S. immigration law essentially ensures the
inefficacy of its family-related provisions, resulting in immigration through illegal
channels, family unity must be maintained as an underlying policy, but the law’s
construct of family informing that policy must expand. Doing so would more truly
adhere to the family unity policy and further the politically prudent ideal of
decreasing illegal immigration. Because anthropologists extensively study
immigration and cultures—often the latter in context of the former, which allows
these scholars to assess the corresponding effects—anthropology provides the
proper way to inform a new, meaningful definition of family that finally endows
family unity with substance.
Currently, immigration law views the individual migrant as a prime number, an
“elementally alone” entity removed from the environmental context in which she
both exists and maneuvers.215 Anthropologists disagree with this view, reporting
that the immigrant acts within an environment comprised of one’s family and one’s
culture.216 Anthropologists no longer regard the immigrant, in mathematical terms,
“as an isolated iota, but rather as an iota raised to the power of a set of family
members.”217 The discipline recognizes that immigrants do not act in isolation but
both in the macro context of the push and pull of a global economy and the micro
context of social processes, such as the family, that transcend geographic, political,
and cultural borders.218 Ahead of the law, anthropology no longer evaluates
immigrants as individuals; the immigrant household now represents the analytic
unit.219 This signifies a structural shift demonstrating the discipline’s superior
cultural expertise and knowledge of the contextual migrant.220
The stage is again set for the United States to consider comprehensive
immigration reform. For any reform to ultimately succeed, Congress must create a
law that reflects an understanding that, like the migrant, the United States does not
exist in isolation. As Professor Trujillo argues:

212. See supra Part II.A.
213. See supra Part II.C.
214. Cruz, supra note 68, at 180.
215. Trujillo, supra note 204, at 421.
216. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 33 (“[M]igrations are never
entirely autonomous or disconnected from family.”).
217. Trujillo, supra note 204, at 421.
218. See Caroline B. Brettell, Theorizing Migration in Anthropology: The Social
Construction of Networks, Identities, Communities, and Globalscapes, in MIGRATION
THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 97, 103–04 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F.
Hollifield eds., 2000).
219. Id. at 107.
220. See Trujillo, supra note 204, at 421.
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United States immigration law is typically seen as an expression with two
terms: a single receiver-country (the United States) interfacing
simultaneously with applicants from a vector of 194 sender-countries. It
might be more useful, however, to re-imagine U.S. immigration as an
expression containing 194 terms, each representing a bi-state
relationship: United States and Slovenia, United States and Togo, etc.221
The shortcomings of current immigration law, however, reveal Congress’s virtual
ineptitude at crafting such a solution, at least when it acts alone and uninformed.
Although the primacy of family-driven immigration has been well known for some
time,222 Congress has effectively failed to furnish the family unity policy with any
actual substance.223 Congressional efforts have been, like the current law, entirely
too limited,224 and worse yet, Congress has, in recent years, actually retreated from
the family unity policy.225
Current legislation before Congress is no better. Indeed, beyond failing to
address the problems created by the severely circumscribed family-sponsor
provisions of the INA, proposed legislation exacerbates the issue. For example,
using the dubious name “Nuclear Family Priority Act,” House Bill 477 ruthlessly
cuts the overall yearly cap on immigration, taking it from 480,000 to 88,000.226
Moreover, the bill further limits the family members that may benefit from a
petition, allowing only for the petitioning for children and spouses.227 In light of
what scholarship tells us, it is difficult to fathom how this bill would help even
those families the bill’s title claims to prioritize. It would do little more than further
undercut the family unity policy and drive illegal immigration by separated families
wishing to reunite.
Professor Trujillo correctly argues for an immigration law that envisages “U.S.
immigration policy as a series of bi-state analyses.”228 Anthropologists have
recognized this migratory duet for some time, and therefore, this discipline
provides the proper means for realizing such a policy. For example, Caroline
Brettell describes that anthropologists often do not follow a “bipolar model” of
migration where a single sending society links to a single receptive locale.229 Such
a model is too limiting, too static; anthropologists recognize that functional
analytical frameworks must account for migration networks that are “facilitating
rather than encapsulating, as permeable, expanding, and fluid rather than as
correlating with a metaphor of a rigid and bounded structure.”230 However, one

221. Id. at 417 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
222. The scholarship on which this Note relies demonstrates this point.
223. See supra Part III.
224. To be sure, Congress has made, albeit limited, efforts to cure some of the defects in
the law. However, as Professor Cruz recounts, these legislative interventions have been
primarily both narrow in scope and short-lived. See generally Cruz, supra note 68, at 167–
75.
225. See Demleitner, supra note 13, at 293.
226. Nuclear Family Priority Act, H.R. 477, 113th Cong. (2013).
227. Id.
228. Trujillo, supra note 204, at 417.
229. Brettell, supra note 218.
230. Id. at 107.
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cannot describe domestic immigration law as a metaphor of any kind, even a rigid
one, because metaphors, by definition, make comparisons of two parts.
Immigration law is, therefore, unlike even the most intransigent metaphor because
of its tremendous egocentrism; it accounts only for itself in ignorance of the other
half of the equation—the sending country.231
Conversely, anthropology avoids this mistake. It evaluates “immigration policy
from the perspective of the immigrant who acts, adapts, and often circumvents.”232
The immigrant does not act in isolation; nor can she adapt to nothing. Most
obviously, she must have something to circumvent. For a productive study, then,
anthropologists evaluate all of these variables, which afford them with their cultural
expertise. If the above were framed as a question—“What compels an immigrant to
act, adapt, and circumvent?”—anthropology has answered it. The immigrant acts in
response to the familial context and its needs,233 adapts to the changing face of
immigration policy,234 and circumvents the law when its impact on the family has
become too onerous.235
Anthropology has reached these conclusions through the in-depth fieldwork
which its social scientists conduct. For instance, in an article Professor Boehm
authored on the transnational family, she described her research methods:
I have interviewed approximately 200 transmigrants, lived with several
Mexican families, and attended events, including weddings,
quinceañeras, baptisms, first communions, and holiday celebrations in
both [Mexico and the United States]. Finally, I have spent time with
transnational Mexicans as they experience their daily lives—in their
homes, at their workplaces, in social settings, and traveling between the
United States and Mexico.236
Additionally, her research demonstrates the ongoing nature of anthropological
inquiry. She expanded upon this same research, which she conducted and continually
supplemented for more than a decade, in writing a book that took a more expansive,
nuanced look at the same topic.237
The exhaustive research methods of anthropology allow the discipline to
distinguish between “the ideal and the actual as a fundamental characteristic of
human experience.”238 Consequently, the discipline can both “[with]stand critical
scrutiny as a mode of producing knowledge . . . [and] yield[] truths of enormous
insight and value, often to the discomfort of conventional Western wisdom.”239 It

231. See Trujillo, supra note 204, at 417.
232. Brettell, supra note 218, at 100.
233. See generally BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1.
234. See id. at 35 (explaining how stays in the United States have lengthened).
235. See id. at 117 (recounting an illegal immigration of children).
236. Boehm, For My Children, supra note 1, at 779.
237. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 22–26 (describing her research
methods).
238. Brettell, supra note 218, at 100.
239. John Comaroff, Notes on Anthropological Method, Mainly in the Key of E 4
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/nsfqual/Comaroff%20
Paper.pdf.
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does just this in the context of immigration law, debunking the ideal, static concept of
the traditional family240 in support of a fluid vision of the household that changes
over time and in context.241 Anthropology understands the various forces at work,
cultural and otherwise, in the immigration process and how those forces affect one
another. Therefore, it “offers the best understanding of the process of migration and
of migrant culture,” an understanding from which the law can and should learn.242
If nothing else, immigration law would benefit from direct, but albeit limited, use
of anthropological methods. Although procedural differences and practical concerns
preclude case-by-case application of anthropological methods, “anthropological and
legal work can overlap, harmonize, and mutually constitute each other.”243 While
courts could not, in the interest of legal administration, “consider the types of factual
ambiguities or changes in culture (or indeed the perspective that culture is fluid,
hybrid, and contingent) that anthropologists consider in their writing,”244 Congress
could engage in this sort of analysis during periods of legislative fact finding, which
would, in turn, create a more informed, inclusive law that would finally provide the
family unity policy with real substance. True, culture is an imperfect concept, but a
law informed by anthropology can account for this imperfection.245 Indeed,
anthropology’s emphasis on awareness of self and one’s own subjectivities would
benefit the legislature, and thereby the resultant law, by keeping it honest through
awareness of ethnocentrism,246 thus allowing it to keep out such biases.247 Ultimately,
any law that attempts to place an amorphous concept, such as family, into a box will
also be imperfect.248 However, a more flexible definition of family will still account
for more familial relationships that fuel immigration than the current, static definition,
which will ultimately decrease illegal immigration.249
This Note acknowledges, as it must, that a more flexible definition of family will
increase legal immigration in lieu of illegal immigration.250 Although family-based
quotas will need to increase in number to give true meaning to family reunification, a
compromise in numbers could be found.251 For instance, Congress could increase
quotas by a number less than the statistical number of immigrants illegally entering
and remaining in the country but more than the current INA provisions allow.252

240. See BOEHM, INTIMATE MIGRATIONS, supra note 1, at 31–67 (exploring how the
family is changing as a result of migration).
241. Brettell, supra note 218, at 101–02.
242. Id. at 118.
243. Bruce-Jones, supra note 18, at 336.
244. Id. at 336–37.
245. See id. at 338.
246. Ethnocentrism is “[t]he attitude or belief that one’s own culture is the best or only
one, and that one can understand or judge another culture in terms of one’s own.” JACK
DAVID ELLER, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: GLOBAL FORCES, LOCAL LIVES 15 (2009). By
evaluating immigrant families in terms of the “traditional” American family, the United
States immigration system fails to account for reality. See supra Part II.B.
247. Bruce-Jones, supra note 18, at 338.
248. See Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 810–11.
249. See supra Part III.
250. See King, supra note 54, at 561–62.
251. See Cruz, supra note 68, at 179.
252. See supra Part II.B. In 2010, an estimated 11.2 million unauthorized illegal immigrants
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Considering that a “long wait without a clear end results in families reunifying by
other means,”253 the United States would benefit from such a compromise. In fact, if
Congress could simply provide a clear, realistic, and meaningful end, which entails
that the concept of the line would no longer be only a myth,254 families would likely
wait to reunify given the harsh consequences of the IIRIRA and the dangers of
immigrating through illegal means.255 Furthermore, in light of the fact that much of
the money earned by immigrants goes to their countries of origin, where their
families are located, the United States could benefit economically; allowing more
legal immigration would keep at least some of the money otherwise sent as
remittances in the domestic economy.256 The money kept in the domestic economy
could offset the administrative costs from increased legal immigration. Additionally,
because legal immigration would likely translate to money saved in terms of border
enforcement, resources “could then be diverted to deal with a heavier volume of
family applications.”257
CONCLUSION
A more flexible definition of family in U.S. immigration law is not only needed,
but the creation of such a workable definition is feasible through an anthropological
lens. As a result of the current law’s family reunification policy, the INA stands as a
living contradiction; it often divides families instead of uniting them—sometimes
permanently. Consequently, families work around the law to be with their loved
ones, exacerbating the problems of illegal immigration. Therefore, to give the
definition of family more flexibility from an informed, anthropological perspective
would decrease illegal immigration, thereby benefiting both families and the United
States.
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